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Abstract
In a generalized network design (GND) problem, a set of resources are assigned (non-
exclusively) to multiple requests. Each request contributes its weight to the resources it uses and
the total load on a resource is then translated to the cost it incurs via a a resource specific cost
function. Motivated by energy efficiency applications, recently, there is a growing interest in
GND using cost functions that exhibit (dis)economies of scale ((D)oS), namely, cost functions
that appear subadditive for small loads and superadditive for larger loads.
The current paper advances the existing literature on approximation algorithms for GND
problems with (D)oS cost functions in various aspects: (1) while the existing results are restricted
to routing requests in undirected graphs, identifying the resources with the graph’s edges, the
current paper presents a generic approximation framework that yields approximation results for a
much wider family of requests (including various types of Steiner tree and Steiner forest requests)
in both directed and undirected graphs, where the resources can be identified with either the
edges or the vertices; (2) while the existing results assume that a request contributes the same
weight to each resource it uses, our approximation framework allows for unrelated weights, thus
providing the first non-trivial approximation for the problem of scheduling unrelated parallel
machines with (D)oS cost functions; (3) while most of the existing approximation algorithms
are based on convex programming, our approximation framework is fully combinatorial and runs
in strongly polynomial time; (4) the family of (D)oS cost functions considered in the current
paper is more general than the one considered in the existing literature, providing a more
accurate abstraction for practical energy conservation scenarios; and (5) we obtain the first
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approximation ratio for GND with (D)oS cost functions that depends only on the parameters
of the resources’ technology and does not grow with the number of resources, the number
of requests, or their weights. The design of our approximation framework relies heavily on
Roughgarden’s smoothness toolbox (JACM 2015), thus demonstrating the possible usefulness
of this toolbox in the area of approximation algorithms.
Keywords: Approximation algorithms, generalized network design, (dis)economies of scale, energy
consumption, real exponent polynomial cost functions, smoothness, best response dynamics
1 Introduction
Generalized Network Design. An instance I of a generalized network design (GND) problem
is defined over a finite set E of resources and N abstract requests. Each request i ∈ [N ] is served
by choosing some reply pi ⊆ E from request i’s reply collection Pi ⊆ 2E . Serving request i with
reply pi contributes wi(e) units to the load le on resource e for each e ∈ pi, where wi ∈ ZE≥1 is
the weight vector associated with request i (specified in I). We emphasize that our GND setting
supports unrelated weights, that is, request i may contribute different weights to the load on
different resources in pi.
One should serve all the requests of the instance I with replies p = {pi}i∈[N ], satisfying pi ∈
Pi for every i ∈ [N ], under the objective of minimizing the total cost C(p). This is defined as
C(p) =
∑
e∈E Fe(le), where Fe : Z≥0 → R≥0 is a resource cost function that maps the load
le = l
p
e =
∑
i∈[N ]:e∈pi wi(e) induced by p on resource e to the cost incurred by that resource.
We restrict our attention to GND problems with succinctly represented requests, namely, re-
quests whose reply collections Pi can be specified using poly(|E|) bits. These requests are often
defined by identifying the resource set E with the edge set of a (directed or undirected) graph
G = (V,E), giving rise to, e.g., the following request types:
• routing requests in directed or undirected graphs, where given a pair (si, ti) ∈ V ×V of terminals,
the reply collection Pi consists of all (si, ti)-paths in G;
• multi-routing requests in directed or undirected graphs, where given a collection Di ⊆ V × V of
terminal pairs, the reply collection Pi consists of all edge subsets F ⊆ E such that the subgraph
(V, F ) admits an (s, t)-path for every (s, t) ∈ Di (useful for designing a multicast scheme);1 and
• set connectivity (resp., set strong connectivity) requests in undirected (resp., directed) graphs,
where given a set Ti ⊆ V of terminals, the reply collection Pi consists of all edge subsets that
induce on G a connected (resp., strongly connected) subgraph that spans Ti (useful for designing
an overlay network).
Alternatively, one can identify the resource set E with the vertex set of a graph, obtaining the
vertex variants of the aforementioned request types, or with any other combinatorial structure as
long as it fits into the aforementioned setting.
1Notice that the multi-routing request given by Di cannot be (trivially) reduced to |Di| (single-)routing requests
since a reply F for the former contributes wi(e) units to the load on edge e ∈ F “only once”, even if this edge is used
to connect multiple terminal pairs in Di.
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(Dis)economies of Scale. The classic network design literature addresses scenarios where the
higher the load on a resource is, the lower is the cost per unit load, thus making it advis-
able to share network resources among requests, commonly known as buy-at-bulk network design
[AA97, And04, CK05, CHKS10]. More formally, the cost functions Fe(·) in buy-at-bulk network
design are assumed to be subadditive, i.e., they exhibit economies of scale. Recently, there is a
growing interest in investigating network design problems with superadditive cost functions (i.e.,
cost functions exhibiting diseconomies of scale) [AAZZ12, MS14] or even cost functions that may
appear subadditive for small loads and superadditive for larger loads [AAZZ12, AIK+14, AAZ16],
referred to as cost functions exhibiting (dis)economies of scale ((D)oS) [AAZ16].
The (D)oS cost functions studied so far in the context of network design capture the energy
consumption of network devices employing the popular speed scaling technique [YDS95, IP05,
BKP07, NPI+08, CRN+10, Alb10, AFAZZ13, AAZ16] that allows the device to adapt its power
level to its actual load. Given a global constant parameter α ∈ R>1 (a.k.a. the load exponent), an
energy consumption cost function for resource e ∈ E is defined by setting
Fe(le) =
0 , le = 0σe + ξe · lαe , le > 0 , (1)
where σe ∈ R≥0 (the startup cost) and ξe ∈ R>0 (the speed scaling factor) are parameters of e.
This paper improves the existing results on approximation algorithms for GND with energy
consumption cost functions in various aspects (see Sec. 1.1). In fact, our results apply to a more
general class of resource cost functions exhibiting (D)oS, referred to as real exponent polynomial
(REP) cost functions. Given global constant parameters q ∈ Z≥1 and α1, . . . , αq ∈ R>1, a REP
cost function for resource e ∈ E is defined by setting
Fe(le) =
0 , le = 0σe +∑j∈[q] ξe,j · lαje , le > 0 , (2)
where σe ∈ R≥0 and ξe,1, . . . , ξe,q ∈ R≥0 are parameters of e, constrained by requiring that ξe,j > 0
for at least one j ∈ [q].
On top of the theoretical interest in studying more general cost functions, there is also a practical
motivation behind their investigation. While some of the theoretical literature on energy efficient
network design considers the special case of (1) where σe = 0 (see Sec. 1.1), it has been claimed
[AAZ16, AIK+14] that the startup cost component is crucial for better capturing practical energy
consumption structures. In fact, in realistic communication networks, even the energy consumption
cost functions of (1) may not be general enough since a link often consists of several different devices
(e.g., transmitter/receiver, amplifier, adapter), all of which are operating when the link is in use.
As their energy consumption may vary in terms of the load exponents and speed scaling factors, the
functions presented in (1) do not provide a suitable abstraction for the link’s energy consumption
and the more general REP cost functions (2) should be employed.
3
Approximation Framework. Our main contribution is a novel approximation framework for
GND problems with REP resource cost functions. This framework yields an approximation algo-
rithm when provided access to an appropriate oracle that we now turn to define. A reply %-oracle,
% ≥ 1, for a family Q of succinctly represented requests is an efficient procedure that given a re-
source set E, the reply collection R ⊆ 2E (specified succinctly) of a request in Q, and a toll function
τ : E → R>0, returns some reply r ∈ R that minimizes the total toll τ(r) =
∑
e∈r τ(e) up to factor
%, i.e., it satisfies τ(r) ≤ % · τ(r′) for every r′ ∈ R. An exact reply oracle is a reply %-oracle with
% = 1.
Notice that the optimization problem behind the reply oracle is not a GND problem: it deals
with a single request (rather than multiple requests) and the role of the resource cost functions
(combined with the weight vectors) is now taken by the (single) toll function. In particular, while
all the (specific) GND problems mentioned in this paper are intractable (to various extents of
inapproximability [AERW04, AAZZ12, Rou14]), the request classes corresponding to some of them
admit exact reply oracles.
For example, routing requests (in directed and undirected graphs) admit an exact reply oracle
implemented using, e.g., Dijkstra’s shortest path algorithm [Dij59, FT87]. In contrast, set con-
nectivity requests in undirected graphs, set strong connectivity requests in directed graphs, and
multi-routing requests in undirected and directed graphs do not admit exact reply oracles unless
P = NP as these would imply exact (efficient) algorithms for the Steiner tree, strongly connected
Steiner subgraph, Steiner forest, and directed Steiner forest problems, respectively. However, em-
ploying known approximation algorithms for the latter (Steiner) problems, one concludes that: set
connectivity requests in undirected graphs admit a reply %-oracle for % ≤ 1.39 [BGRS13]; set strong
connectivity requests in directed graphs admit a reply t-oracle, where t = |T | is the number of ter-
minals [CCC+98]; multi-routing requests in undirected graphs admit a reply 2-oracle [AKR95]; and
multi-routing requests in directed graphs admit a reply k1/2+-oracle, where k = |D| is the number
of terminal pairs [CEGS11]. This means, in particular, that set connectivity replies and multi-
routing replies in undirected graphs always admit a reply %-oracle with a constant approximation
ratio %, whereas set strong connectivity replies and multi-routing replies in directed graphs admit
such an oracle whenever |T | and |D| are fixed. The guarantees of our approximation framework
are cast in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Consider some GND problem P with succinctly represented requests using REP re-
source cost functions as defined in (2). Suppose that the requests of P admit a reply %-oracle OP .
When provided with free access to OP , our approximation framework yields a randomized efficient
approximation algorithm AP for P whose approximation ratio is
O
(
%maxj αj+1 + % ·maxe minj
(
σe
ξe,j
)1/αj)
with high probability. Moreover, our approximation framework is fully combinatorial and it runs
in strongly polynomial time, so if OP is implemented to run in strongly polynomial time, then AP
also runs in strongly polynomial time.
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We emphasize that when % = O(1), the approximation ratio promised in Thm. 1 becomes
O
(
1 + maxe minj
(
σe
ξe,j
)1/αj)
which is free of any dependence on the number |E| of resources, the number N of requests, and
the weight vectors {wi}i∈[N ]; rather, it depends only on the parameters (σe, ξe,j) of the network
resources’ technology (speed scaling in case q = 1). Notice that the hidden expressions in our O
notations may depend on the parameters q and α1, . . . , αq assumed to be constants throughout this
paper.
1.1 Comparison to Existing Results
GND with Routing Requests. The existing literature on (generalized) network design beyond
subadditive resource cost functions [AAZZ12, AIK+14, MS14, AAZ16] focuses on routing requests,
identifying the resources with the edges of a graph, and with the exception of [MS14], it is restricted
to undirected graphs and related weights, i.e., wi(e) = wi for every e ∈ E. In contrast, the cur-
rent paper handles a wider class of request types over much more general combinatorial structures
(including both directed and undirected graphs) and our approximation framework supports unre-
lated weights. Moreover, the current paper addresses the general REP cost functions (2), whereas
as stated beforehand, the existing literature addresses only the energy consumption cost functions
(1) and special cases thereof (Table 1 summarizes the relevant approximation upper bounds).
Specifically, Makarychev and Sviridenko [MS14] consider purely superadditive cost functions by
restricting (1) to σe = 0 for all e ∈ E, obtaining an approximation ratio of (1 + )Bα, where Bα
is the fractional Bell number with parameter α. This improves the prior O
(
logα−1wmax
)
upper
bound of Andrews et al. [AAZZ12], where wmax = maxi∈[N ]wi. The case where the startup cost
σe may be positive is addressed by Antoniadis et al. [AIK
+14], obtaining an approximation ratio
of O (logαN), but this result is limited to the uniform case where wi = 1 for all i ∈ [N ].
As stated in [AAZ16, AIK+14], for a more accurate abstraction of practical energy conservation
scenarios, the cost function definition of (1) with positive startup costs and arbitrary (related)
weights is unavoidable. In this setting, three different approximation ratios have been devised by
Andrews et al.: O
((
1 + maxe
σe
ξe
)1/α
logα−1wmax
)
and O
(
N + logα−1wmax
)
in [AAZZ12]; and
polylog(N) · logα−1wmax in [AAZ16].2
We emphasize that these three approximation ratios grow with the number N of traffic requests
and/or the maximum weight wmax, whereas the approximation ratio established in the current
paper depends only on the parameters of the network resources’ technology. Furthermore, the
algorithms behind these approximation ratios are based on linear/convex programming and their
(currently known) implementations do not run in strongly polynomial time (this is true also for the
algorithm of [MS14]). In contrast, the approximation framework developed in the present paper is
purely combinatorial with a strongly polynomial run-time.
2Actually, in [AAZ16], the startup cost term in the cost function is somewhat restricted.
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paper graphs weights algorithm restrictions approx. ratio
[AAZZ12] undir. related math. prog. none
O
(
1 +
(
maxe
σe
ξe
) 1
α
logα−1wmax
)
O
(
N + logα−1wmax
)
[AAZ16] undir. related math. prog. σeξe =
σe′
ξe′
polylog(N) ·O (logα−1wmax)
[AIK+14] undir. wi = 1 combin. ξe = 1 O (log
αN)
[AAZZ12] undir. related math. prog. σe = 0 O
(
logα−1wmax
)
[MS14] un/dir. unrel. math. prog. σe = 0 (1 + )Bα
current un/dir. unrel. combin. none O
(
1 +
(
maxe
σe
ξe
) 1
α
)
Table 1: Comparison of the approximation algorithms for GND with routing requests (identifying
the resources with the graph edges) under the energy consumption cost functions (1) and restrictions
thereof.
Scheduling Unrelated Parallel Machines. While GND with routing requests and related
weights is a classic problem by its own right, generalizing it to unrelated weights not also makes
this abstraction suitable for a wider class of GND scenarios, but also captures the extensively
studied problem of scheduling unrelated parallel machines. This problem can be represented as GND
with routing requests over a graph consisting of two vertices and multiple parallel edges (referred
to as machines) between them. The earlier algorithmic treatment of this problem considers the
objective of minimizing the `∞ norm (a.k.a. makespan) of the machines’ load [LST90, ST93].3
Later on, the focus has shifted to minimizing the `p norm of the machines’ load for p ∈ (1,∞)
[AAG+95, AERW04, AE05, KMPS09, MS14]. The state of the art approximation algorithm in
this regard is the one developed by Kumar et al. [KMPS09] with a < 2 approximation ratio for
all p ∈ (1,∞). Makarychev and Sviridenko [MS14] studied this problem for small values of p and
designed a p
√Bp-approximation, improving upon the upper bound of [KMPS09] for the p ∈ (1, 2]
regime.
The `p norm optimization criterion corresponds to the energy consumption cost function (1)
restricted to zero startup costs σe = 0 (energy efficiency is also the main motivation of [MS14]). In
practice, however, machines’ energy consumption typically incurs a positive startup cost [AAZ16,
AIK+14]. This motivated Khuller et al. [KLS10, LK11] to study a variant of unrelated parallel ma-
chine scheduling in which the (sub)set of activated machines should satisfy some budget constraint
on the startup costs. To the best of our knowledge, the current paper presents the first non-trivial
approximation algorithm for scheduling unrelated parallel machines that takes into account the
3This objective does not fit into the formulation of minimizing the sum of the resource cost functions considered
in our paper.
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(positive) machines’ startup costs σe > 0 as part of the objective function.
1.2 Paper Organization.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sec. 2 introduces the concepts and notations used
in the design and analysis of the proposed approximation framework. Following that, a technical
overview of the approximation framework’s design and analysis is provided in Sec. 3. The actual
approximation framework is presented in Sec. 4 and analyzed in Sec. 5– 8. Two variants of the
proposed approximation framework, which are more feasible for a decentralized environment, are
presented in Sec. 9. In Sec. 10, we establish additional bounds that demonstrate the tightness of
certain components of the analysis. Finally, alternative approaches for designing GND approxima-
tion algorithms are discussed in Sec. 11. In particular, Sec. 11.2 discusses an alternative algorithm
for the GND problem with routing requests using convex optimization and randomized rounding.
2 Preliminaries
Throughout, we consider some GND problem P with succinctly represented requests using REP
resource cost functions (2). Let
I =
〈
E, {Pi, {wi(e)}e∈E}i∈[N ] , {αj}j∈[q] ,
{
σe, {ξe,j}j∈[q]
}
e∈E
〉
be some P instance. Let p∗ be an optimal solution for I and C∗ = C(p∗) be its total cost.
GND Games and Cost Sharing Mechanisms. A key ingredient of the approximation frame-
work designed in this paper is a GND game derived from instance I. In this game, each request
i ∈ [N ] is associated with a strategic player i that decides on the reply pi ∈ Pi serving the request.
In the scope of this GND game, the reply pi ∈ Pi is referred to as the strategy of player i and
the reply collection Pi is referred to as her strategy space. We let P = (P1, . . . , PN ) and refer to
p = (p1, . . . , pN ) ∈ P as the (players’) strategy profile. Although the strategy profile p is a vector
of replies, we may slightly abuse the notation and write e ∈ p when we mean that e ∈ ⋃i∈[N ] pi.
The cost Fe(le) of each resource e ∈ E is divided among the players based on a cost sharing
mechanism (CSM) M = {fi,e(·)}i∈[N ],e∈E , where fi,e : P → R≥0 is a cost sharing function that
determines the cost share fi,e(p) incurred by player i ∈ [N ] for resource e under strategy profile
p, subject to the constraint that
∑
i∈[N ] fi,e(p) = Fe(l
p
e). Player i chooses her strategy pi with
the objective of minimizing her individual cost Ci(p) =
∑
e∈E fi,e(p), irrespective of the total cost
C(p) =
∑
i∈[N ]Ci(p) (a.k.a. the social cost).
CSM M = {fi,e(·)}i∈[N ],e∈E is said to be separable and uniform (cf. [CRV10, vFH13]) if the
cost share of player i ∈ [N ] in resource e ∈ E satisfies (1) if e /∈ pi, then fi,e(p) = 0; and (2) fi,e(p)
is fully determined by wi(e) and by the multiset of weights of the (other) players using resource
e. Notice that fi,e(p) is independent of the identities and weights of the players using any resource
e′ 6= e. It may be convenient to write fi,e(Se) instead of fi,e(p), where Se = {j ∈ [N ] | e ∈ pj},
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although, strictly speaking, fi,e(p) is also independent of the identities (rather than weights) of the
players in Se − {i}. Unless stated otherwise, all CSMs considered in this paper are separable and
uniform.
Best Response. Following the convention in the game theoretic literature, given some i ∈ [N ]
and a strategy profile p = (p1, . . . , pN ), let p−i = (p1, . . . , pi−1, pi+1, . . . , pN ); likewise, let P−i =
P1 × · · · × Pi−1 × Pi+1 × · · · × PN . Given some approximation parameter χ ≥ 1, strategy pi ∈ Pi
is an approximate best response (ABR) of player i to p−i ∈ P−i if Ci(pi, p−i) ≤ χ · Ci(p′i, p−i) for
every p′i ∈ Pi. A best response (BR) is an ABR with approximation parameter χ = 1.
A best response dynamic (BRD) (resp., approximate best response dynamic (ABRD)) is an
iterative procedure that given an initial strategy profile p0 ∈ P , generates a sequence p1, p2, . . . of
strategy profiles adhering to the rule that for every t = 1, 2, . . . , there exists some i ∈ [N ] such that
(1) pt−i = p
t−1
−i ; and (2) p
t
i is a BR (resp., ABR) of player i to p
t−1
−i .
Strategy profile p ∈ P is a (pure) Nash equilibrium (NE) of the GND game if pi is a BR to p−i
for every i ∈ [N ]. The (pure) price of anarchy (PoA) of the GND game is defined to be the ratio
C(p)/C∗, where p ∈ P is a NE strategy profile that maximizes the social cost C(p).
Smoothness. The following definition of Roughgarden [Rou15] plays a key role in our analysis:
Given parameters λ > 0 and 0 < µ < 1, we say that the GND game is (λ, µ)-smooth if∑
i
Ci(p
′
i, p−i) ≤ λC(p′) + µC(p) (3)
for any two strategy profiles p, p′ ∈ P .4 The game is said to be smooth if it is (λ, µ)-smooth for
some λ > 0 and 0 < µ < 1.
Potential Functions. Function Φ : P → R+ is said to be a potential function if for every i ∈ [N ]
and for any two strategy profiles p and p′ with p−i = p′−i, it holds that
Φ(p′)− Φ(p) = Ci(p′)− Ci(p) .
A game admitting a potential function is said to be a potential game. The potential function Φ(p)
is said to be (A,B)-bounded for some parameters A ≥ 1 and B ≥ 1 if
Φ(p)/A ≤ C(p) ≤ B · Φ(p)
for any strategy profile p ∈ P .
Additional Notation and Terminology. Throughout, we think of  > 0 as a sufficiently small
(positive) constant and fix 1 =
1+
1− . A probabilistic event A is said to occur with high probability
(w.h.p.) if P(A) ≥ 1− 1/(|E|+N)b, where b is an arbitrarily large constant.
4The original definition of Roughgarden [Rou15], that applies for all cost minimization games, also requires that
C(p) =
∑
i∈[N ] Ci(p), but this property is assumed to hold for all CSMs considered in the current paper, so we do
not mention it explicitly.
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3 Technical Overview
The key concept in the design of our generic approximation framework is to decouple between the
combinatorial structure of the specific GND problem P, captured by the request types (and encoded
in the reply collections), and the (D)oS cost functions of the individual resources. Informally, the
former is handled by the reply oracle OP (specifically tailored for P), whereas for the latter, we
harness the power of Roughgarden’s smoothness toolbox [Rou15]. Since this toolbox was originally
introduced in the context of game theory rather than algorithm design, we first transform the given
P instance into a GND game by carefully choosing the CSM (more on that soon). The algorithm
then progresses via a sequence of player individual improvements in the form of a BRD, where each
BRD step is implemented by invoking OP with a toll function constructed based on the current
strategy profile p ∈ P , the choice of player i ∈ [N ], and her cost sharing functions fi,e(·), e ∈ E
(Sec. 4).5
In order to establish the promised upper bound on the approximation ratio, we first analyze
the smoothness parameters of the aforementioned GND game (Sec. 6) which allows us to bound
its PoA, thus ensuring that the total cost C(p) of any NE strategy profile p ∈ P provides the
desired approximation for the (global) optimum C∗. This part of the proof relies on introducing
and analyzing a new class of REP-expanded CSMs (Sec. 6), interesting in its own right.
One may hope that a BRD of the GND game converges to a NE strategy profile p ∈ P ,
but unfortunately, the BRD need not necessarily converge, and even if it does converge, it need
not necessarily be in polynomially many steps. Inspired by another component of the smoothness
toolbox [Rou15] (which is in turn inspired by [AAE+08]), we show (in Sec. 5) that if the game admits
a bounded potential function, then after simulating the BRD for polynomially many steps, one
necessarily encounters a strategy profile p ∈ P that yields the promised approximation guarantee
(although it is not necessarily a NE).
Does our GND game admit the desired bounded potential function? The answer to this question
depends, once again, on the choice of a CSM. We therefore look for a CSM with three (possibly
conflicting) considerations in mind: the game that it induces must admit a bounded potential
function; it must be REP-expanded; and it must be efficiently computable. We prove that the
Shapley CSM satisfies the first two conditions (Sec. 7 and 6, respectively) and although its exact
computation is #P-hard, we manage to adapt the approximation scheme of [LNSWW12], originally
designed for superadditive cost functions, to accommodate the REP cost functions (2) with positive
startup costs σe > 0 (Sec. 8). This presents another obstacle though since the original technique of
[Rou15] assumes (implicitly) that each step in the BRD is (as the definition implies) an exact BR.
To overcome this obstacle, we show that an ABRD is still good enough for our needs (Sec. 5).
We believe that the construction described here demonstrates the usefulness of algorithmic game
theory tools for algorithm design even for optimization problems that on the face of it, are not at
all concerned with game theory. A similar concept is demonstrated by Cole et al. [CCG+11] who
5In this section (only), we assume for simplicity that OP is an exact reply oracle.
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obtained an improved combinatorial algorithm for job scheduling on unrelated machines, with the
objective of minimizing the weighted sum of completion times, based on the game theoretic tools
developed in [AAE+08]. In comparison, we employ the smoothness toolbox [Rou15] for the design
and analysis of our approximation framework. It is the robustness of this toolbox that plays the
key role in the generality of our framework that can be applied to a wide family of GND problems.
This is in contrast to most of the existing approximation algorithms for such problems that rely
on linear/convex programming and are therefore heavily tailored to one specific GND problem and
much less generic.
4 Algorithm Description
Let OP be a reply %-oracle for the requests of the GND problem P. Our goal is to design an
approximation algorithm with free access to OP as promised in Thm. 1. We shall refer to this
approximation algorithm as Alg-ABRD.
Given an instance I =
〈
E, {Pi, {wi(e)}e∈E}i∈[N ] , {αj}j∈[q] ,
{
σe, {ξe,j}j∈[q]
}
e∈E
〉
of P, we
first construct (conceptually) the GND game induced by I and a carefully chosen CSM M =
{fi,e(·)}i∈[N ],e∈E . On top of the other properties of M that will be discussed in the next sections,
we require that M is poly-time -computable, namely, that given I, p ∈ P , and i ∈ [N ], it is possible
to compute in time poly(|E|, N) some -cost shares f˜i,e(p), e ∈ E, that satisfy
(1− )fi,e(p) ≤ f˜i,e(p) ≤ (1 + )fi,e(p)
w.h.p. Define the -individual cost C˜i(p) to be the sum C˜i(p) =
∑
e∈E f˜i,e(p), which means that
(1− )Ci(p) ≤ C˜i(p) ≤ (1 + )Ci(p)
w.h.p. As we shall perform the computations of the -cost shares (and the -individual costs)
poly(|E|, N) times, all of them succeed w.h.p.; condition hereafter on this event.
To simplify the presentation, we assume that the values of the -cost shares f˜i,e(p), e ∈ E, and
the -individual costs C˜i(p) have already been fixed before the algorithm’s execution for all i ∈ [N ]
and p ∈ P in an (arbitrary) manner that satisfies the aforementioned -approximation inequalities;
the algorithm then merely “exposes” some (poly(|E|, N) many) of these values. The following
lemma plays a key role in the design of Alg-ABRD.
Lemma 4.1. If M is a poly-time -computable CSM, then there exists a randomized procedure that
given i ∈ [N ] and p−i ∈ P−i, runs in time poly(|E|, N) and computes a strategy pi ∈ Pi and the
corresponding -individual cost C˜i(pi, p−i) such that C˜i(pi, p−i) ≤ % · C˜i(p′i, p−i) for any p′i ∈ Pi.
This means in particular that pi is an ABR of player i to p−i with approximation parameter %1.6
6All subsequent occurrences of the term ABR (and ABRD) share the same approximation parameter %1, hence
we may refrain from mentioning this parameter explicitly.
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Proof. Construct the toll function τi,p−i : E → R≥0 by setting τi,p−i(e) to be the -cost share
f˜i,e(Se∪{i}), where Se = {j ∈ [N ]−{i} | e ∈ pj}. This can be done in time poly(|E|, N) since M is
poly-time -computable. The assumption that M is separable and uniform guarantees that a reply
pi ∈ Pi that minimizes the total toll
∑
e∈pi τi,p−i(e) up to factor % satisfies C˜i(pi, p−i) ≤ %·C˜i(p′i, p−i)
for any p′i ∈ Pi and that the sum
∑
e∈pi τi,p−i(e) is the desired -individual cost. Such a reply pi
can be computed using the reply %-oracle OP .
Employing the procedure promised by Lem. 4.1, Alg-ABRD simulates an ABRD p0, p1, . . . of
the GND game induced by I and M that includes at most T iterations for some T = poly(|E|, N)
whose exact value will be determined later. This is done as follows (see also Pseudocode 1).
Pseudocode 1 Alg-ABRD
1: Input: A GND instance I =
〈
E, {Pi, {wi(e)}e∈E}i∈[N ] , {αj}j∈[q] ,
{
σe, {ξe,j}j∈[q]
}
e∈E
〉
2: Output: A profile p ∈ P that is feasible for the given instance I
3: for all i ∈ [N ] do
4: set τ0i to be the toll function defined by setting τ
0
i (e) = Fe(wi(e)) for every e ∈ E
5: set p0i to be the output of oracle OP on E, Pi, and τ0i
6: t← 0
7: while t < T do
8: t← t+ 1
9: for all i ∈ [N ] do
10: set p′i to be an ABR of player i to p
t−1
−i with approximation parameter %1
11: δti ← C˜i(pt−1)− 1 · C˜i(p′i, pt−1−i )
12: if δti ≤ 0 for all i ∈ [N ] then
13: pt ← pt−1
14: break
15: ∆t ←∑i∈[N ] δti
16: pick some j ∈ [N ] such that δti > 0 and δti ≥ ∆t/N
17: pt ← (p′j , pt−1−j )
18: t∗ = argmintC(pt)
19: return pt
∗
Set p0 by taking p0i , i ∈ [N ], to be the strategy generated by OP for the toll function τ0i
defined by setting τ0i (e) = Fe(wi(e)). Assuming that p
t−1, 1 ≤ t ≤ T , was already constructed, we
construct pt as follows. For i ∈ [N ], employ the procedure promised by Lem. 4.1 to compute an
ABR p′i of player i to p
t−1
−i and let δ
t
i = C˜i(p
t−1) − 1 · C˜i(p′i, pt−1−i ). If δti ≤ 0 for all i ∈ [N ], then
the ABRD stops, and we set pt = pt−1; in this case, we say that the ABRD converges. Otherwise,
fix ∆t =
∑
i∈[N ] δ
t
i and choose some player i
′ ∈ [N ] so that
δti′ > 0 and δ
t
i′ ≥
1
N
∆t (4)
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to update her strategy, setting pt = (p′i′ , p
t−1
−i′ ) (the existence of such a player is guaranteed by the
pigeonhole principle).
When the ABRD terminates (either because it has reached iteration t = T or because it
converged), Alg-ABRD chooses an iteration t∗ such that the corresponding strategy profile pt∗ has a
minimum total cost C(pt
∗
) and outputs pt
∗
. (Recall that in contrast to the player individual costs,
the social cost can always be computed efficiently.)
5 Analyzing Alg-ABRD
In this section, we begin our journey towards bounding the approximation ratio and run-time
of Alg-ABRD as promised by Thm. 1. The analysis relies on a careful choice of the CSM M =
{fi,e(·)}i∈[N ],e∈E . In particular, we are looking for a CSM whose induced GND game is smooth and
admits a bounded potential function with the right choice of parameters. The reason for that will
be made clear in Thm. 5.3 whose proof relies on Lem. 5.1 and 5.2; the former provides an upper
bound on the approximation ratio when the ABRD converges, whereas the latter is used to bound
the number T of steps in the ABRD (and is the key to ensuring strongly polynomial run-time).
Lemma 5.1. Suppose that the CSM M is chosen so that the induced GND game is (λ, µ)-smooth
with µ < 1/(%21). If the ABRD simulated in Alg-ABRD converges at step t for any t ∈ [T ], then the
last strategy profile pt satisfies
C(pt) ≤ %
2
1λ
1− %21µ
· C∗ .
Proof. Recalling that we use p′i to represent the ABR of player i to p
t, we observe that
C(pt) =
∑
i
Ci(p
t)
≤ 1
1− 
∑
i
C˜i(p
t)
≤ 1
1− 1
∑
i
C˜i(p
′
i, p
t
−i)
≤ 1
1− 1 · %
∑
i
C˜i(p
∗
i , p
t
−i)
≤ %21 ·
∑
i
Ci(p
∗
i , p
t
−i)
≤ %21(λ · C∗ + µ · C(pt)) ,
where the second and fifth transitions follow from the definition of -individual cost, the third tran-
sition holds since the algorithm converges at step t, the fourth transition holds following Lem. 4.1,
and the sixth transition follows from the definition of (λ, µ)-smoothness.
Lemma 5.2. The initial strategy profile p0 of Alg-ABRD satisfies C(p0) ≤ % ·Nmaxj αj · C∗.
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Proof. The construction of p0 guarantees that∑
e∈p0i
[
σe +
∑
j∈[q]
ξe,j(wi(e))
αj
]
≤ % ·
∑
e∈p∗i
[
σe +
∑
j∈[q]
ξe,j(wi(e))
αj
]
.
Therefore,∑
i∈[N ]
∑
e∈p0i
[
σe +
∑
j∈[q]
ξe,j(wi(e))
αj
]
≤ % ·
∑
i∈[N ]
∑
e∈p∗i
[
σe +
∑
j∈[q]
ξe,j(wi(e))
αj
]
≤ % ·
∑
e∈p∗
[
N · σe +
∑
j∈[q]
ξe,j ·
∑
i:e∈p∗i
(wi(e))
αj
]
≤ % ·
∑
e∈p∗
[
N · σe +
∑
j∈[q]
ξe,j ·
( ∑
i:e∈p∗i
wi(e)
)αj]
≤ % ·N
∑
e∈p∗
[
σe +
∑
j∈[q]
ξe,j ·
( ∑
i:e∈p∗i
wi(e)
)αj]
= %N · C∗ ,
where the third transition follows from the superadditivity and the last transition holds since lp∗e > 0
for every e ∈ p∗. Then,
C(p0) =
∑
e∈p0
[
σe +
∑
j∈[q]
ξe,j
( ∑
i:e∈p0i
wi(e)
)αj]
≤
∑
e∈p0
[
σe +
∑
j∈[q]
ξe,j ·Nαj−1
∑
i:e∈p0i
(wi(e))
αj
]
≤
∑
e∈p0
[ ∑
i:e∈p0i
σe +
∑
j∈[q]
ξe,j ·Nαj−1
∑
i:e∈p0i
(wi(e))
αj
]
≤Nmaxj αj−1
∑
e∈p0
∑
i:e∈p0i
[
σe +
∑
j
ξe,j(wi(e))
αj
]
=Nmaxj αj−1
∑
i∈[N ]
∑
e∈p0i
[
σe +
∑
j
ξe,j(wi(e))
αj
]
≤ %Nmaxj αj · C∗ ,
where the second transition holds because owing to the convexity,(∑
i:e∈p0i wi(e)
|Sp0e |
)αj
≤ 1
|Sp0e |
∑
i:e∈p0i
(wi(e))
αj ,
which means that( ∑
i:e∈p0i
wi(e)
)αj ≤ |Sp0e |αj−1 ∑
i:e∈p0i
(wi(e))
αj ≤ Nαj−1
∑
i:e∈p0i
(wi(e))
αj .
The assertion follows.
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Theorem 5.3. Suppose that the CSM M is chosen so that the induced GND game admits an
(A,B)-bounded potential function Φ and is (λ, µ)-smooth with µ < 1/(%21). Let Q =
21NA
1−%21µ
. If
T = dQ · ln (ABNmaxj αj )e, then the output pt∗ of Alg-ABRD satisfies
C(pt
∗
) ≤ 2%
2
1λ
1− %21µ
· C∗ .
Proof. Lem. 5.1 ensures that the assertion holds if our ABRD converges at any step t ≤ T , so it is
left to analyze the case where the ABRD does not converge. We say that profile pt of the ABRD
is bad if
C(pt) >
2%21λ
1− %21µ
· C∗ .
Claim 5.4. For any t < T , if pt is bad, then Φ(pt+1) < (1− 1/Q) · Φ(pt).
Proof. Fix
dt =
1
1− 
[ ∑
i∈[N ]
C˜i(p
t)− % · 1
∑
i∈[N ]
C˜i(p
∗
i , p
t
−i)
]
. (5)
This means that
C(pt) =
∑
i∈[N ]
Ci(p
t) ≤ 1
1− 
∑
i∈[N ]
C˜i(p
t)
=
%1
1− 
∑
i∈[N ]
C˜i(p
∗
i , p
t
−i) + d
t
≤ %21
∑
i∈[N ]
Ci(p
∗
i , p
t
−i) + d
t
≤ %21(λ · C∗ + µC(pt)) + dt .
Therefore, dt ≥ [1− %21µ]C(pt)− %21λ · C∗, hence, if pt is bad, then dt satisfies
dt >
[
1− %21µ
]
C(pt)− 1− %
2
1µ
2
C(pt) =
1− %21µ
2
C(pt) . (6)
Since the ABRD does not converge at step t, there exists a player it being selected to update
its strategy. Recalling that the ABR of player i to pt is denoted by p′i, we observe that
Φ(pt)− Φ(pt+1) = Cit(pt)− Cit(p′it , pt−it)
≥ 1
1 + 
C˜it(p
t)− 1
1− C˜it(p
′
it , p
t
−it)
=
1
1 + 
[
C˜it(p
t)− 1C˜it(p′it , pt−it)
]
≥ 1
1 + 
· 1
N
∑
i∈[N ]
[
C˜i(p
t)− 1C˜i(p′i, pt−j)
]
≥ 1
1 + 
· 1
N
∑
i∈[N ]
[
C˜i(p
t)− % · 1C˜i(p∗i , pt−j)
]
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=
1− 
1 + 
· d
t
N
>
1− 
1 + 
· 1
2N
[
1− %21µ
]
C(pt)
≥ 1
1
· 1
2N
[
1− %21µ
] Φ(pt)
A
,
where the fourth transition follows from Eq. (4), the fifth transition holds since p′it is the ABR
promised by Lemma 4.1, which means that C˜it(p
′
it , p
t
−it) ≤ % · C˜it(p∗it , pt−it), the sixth and seventh
transitions follow from Eq. (5) and Eq. (6), respectively, and the last transition holds because the
potential function is assumed to be (A,B)-bounded. Therefore,
Φ(pt+1) < Φ(pt)
(
1− 1− %
2
1µ
21NA
)
= (1− 1/Q) · Φ(pt)
as promised.  (Claim 5.4)
Since Alg-ABRD outputs the strategy profile with the minimum total cost among all the gener-
ated strategy profiles, this theorem holds if any of these strategy profiles is not bad.
Claim 5.5. If all the T + 1 strategy profiles in the ABRD are bad, then C(pT ) < % · C∗.
Proof. Claim 5.4 implies that if all the T + 1 profiles in the ABRD are bad, then
Φ(pT ) <
(
1− 1
Q
)T
Φ(p0) =
(
1− 1
Q
)⌈Q·ln(ABNmaxj αj)⌉
Φ(p0) ≤ 1
ABNmaxj αj
Φ(p0) .
By the definition of the bounded potential function and by Lem. 5.2, we have
C(pT ) ≤ B · Φ(pT ) < B
ABNmaxj αj
Φ(p0) ≤ A
ANmaxj αj
C(p0) ≤ %N
maxj αjC∗
Nmaxj αj
= % · C∗
which completes the proof.  (Claim 5.5)
Claim 5.6. % <
2%21λ
1−%21µ
.
Proof. For any cost minimization (λ, µ)-smooth game that has a (bounded) potential function, we
have λ1−µ ≥ 1. This is because the existence of a potential function implies the existence of a (pure)
NE p ∈ P with C(p) ≤ λ1−µC∗ [Rou15]. Therefore,
2%21λ
1−%21µ
> 2%λ1−µ > %.  (Claim 5.6)
By combining Claims 5.5 and 5.6, we conclude that not all T+1 profiles are bad, thus completing
the proof.
Remark 5.7. Roughgarden [Rou15] proves that in the BRD of a (λ, µ)-smooth game, the number
of strategy profiles whose cost is larger than λ(1−υ)(1−µ) ·C∗ for some constant υ ∈ (0, 1) is bounded
by a polynomial. However, his proof depends on the exact values of the cost shares and exact best
responses, both of which may be intractable in our GND setting.
In the following sections, we search for a CSM whose induced GND game is (λ, µ)-smooth and
admits an (A,B)-bounded potential function for parameters λ, µ, A, and B that when plugged
into Thm. 5.3, yield the desired approximation ratio and run-time bounds.
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6 Smoothness of the GND Game
In this section, a rather wide class of CSMs is presented and the smoothness parameters of the
induced GND games are analyzed. The proof that an adequate potential function exists for (the
GND game induced by) one of these CSMs is deferred to Sec. 7.
A CSM (for GND games) is said to be REP-expanded if the cost share fi,e(p) satisfies
fi,e(p) ≤ σe +
∑
j∈[q]
ξe,j
Kj∑
k=1
zk,j (l
p
e − wi(e))xk,j (wi(e))yk,j ,
for any player i ∈ [N ], edge e ∈ E, and strategy profile p ∈ P , where Kj , 0 ≤ xk,j ≤ αj − 1,
1 ≤ yk,j ≤ αj , and zk,j , k ∈ [Kj ], are non-negative constants that can only depend on αj ; moreover,
we require that xk,j + yk,j = αj . Note that the exponents xk,j and yk,j and the coefficient zk,j are
not necessarily integral.
Theorem 6.1. Consider some REP-expanded CSM M . For any % ≥ 1, the GND
game induced by M is guaranteed to be (γα + λα · %maxj αj , 1/(2%))-smooth, where γα =
maxe∈E minj∈[q]
(
1
αj−1 · σeξe,j
)1/αj
and λα > 0 is a positive constant that depends only on q and
α1, . . . , αq.
Proof. Our goal in this proof is to show that (3) holds with λ = γα + λα · %maxj αj and µ = 1/(2%).
We begin by observing that∑
i∈[N ]
Ci(p
′
i, p−i) =
∑
i∈[N ]
∑
e∈p′i
fi,e(p
′
i, p−i)
≤
∑
i∈[N ]
∑
e∈p′i
σe + ∑
j∈[q]
ξe,j
Kj∑
k=1
zk,j(l
p
e)
xk,j (wi(e))
yk,j

≤
∑
i∈[N ]
∑
e∈p′i
σe +
∑
j∈[q],k∈[Kj ]
zk,j
∑
e∈p′
ξe,j(l
p
e)
xk,j
∑
i:e∈p′i
(wi(e))
yk,j
≤
∑
e∈p′
σel
p′
e +
∑
j∈[q],k∈[Kj ]
zk,j
∑
e∈p′
ξe,j(l
p
e)
xk,j (lp
′
e )
yk,j ,
where the second transition follows by the definition of REP-expanded CSMs because when player
i deviates to p′i, the load on edge e ∈ p′i is at most lpe + wi(e) and the last transition holds because
(1) wi(e) ≥ 1, hence |{i ∈ [N ] : e ∈ p′i}| ≤ lp
′
e for any edge e; and (2) (wi(e))
yk, j is a superadditive
function of wi(e), hence
∑
i:e∈p′i(wi(e))
yk, j ≤ (∑i:e∈p′i wi(e))yk, j = (lp′e )yk . The desired upper bound
on
∑
e∈p′ σel
p′
e +
∑
j,k zk, j
∑
e∈p′ ξe, j(l
p
e)xk, j (l
p′
e )yk, j is established in Claims 6.2 and 6.3.
Claim 6.2.
∑
e∈p′
σel
p′
e ≤ γα · C(p′)
Proof. Define the function g(x) = σxσ+ξxα for arbitrary positive numbers σ > 0, ξ > 0 and α > 1.
Since its derivative is
g′(x) =
σ
(σ + ξxα)2
[σ − (α− 1)ξxα] ,
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it attains its maximum for x ≥ 0 at x =
(
σ
ξ(α−1)
)1/α
. Therefore, for any x ≥ 0, we have
σ · x
σ + ξ · xα = g(x) ≤ g
(
(σ/ξ(α− 1))1/α
)
=
σ
(
σ
ξ(α−1)
)1/α
σ + ξ σξ(α−1)
=
(
1
α− 1 ·
σ
ξ
)1/α/(
1 +
1
α− 1
)
.
Let j∗e ∈ argminj∈[q]
(
1
αj−1 · σeξe, j
)1/αj
. By the inequality above, we have
σel
p′
e <
(
1
αj∗e − 1
· σe
ξe,j∗e
)1/αj∗e · [σe + ξe,j∗e (lp′e )1/αj∗e ] ≤ ( 1αj∗e − 1 · σeξe,j∗e
)1/αj∗e · Fe(lp′e ) .
The assertion follows since
(
1
αj∗e−1
· σeξe,j∗e
)1/αj∗e ≤ γα for every e ∈ E.  (Claim 6.2)
Fix zmax = dmaxj, k zk, je and let λα = maxj∈[q](2Kj · zmax)maxj αj+1.
Claim 6.3.
∑q
j=1
∑Kj
k=1 zk,j
∑
e∈p′ ξe,j(l
p
e)xk,j (l
p′
e )yk,j ≤ λα%maxj αjC(p′) + C(p)/(2%).
Proof. Let p and p′ be any two profiles. First, consider the terms
∑
e∈p′ ξe, j(l
p
e)xk, j (l
p′
e )yk, j with
xk, j > 0. These terms satisfy∑
e∈p′
ξe,j(l
p
e)
xk,j (lp
′
e )
yk,j =
∑
e∈p∩p′
ξe,j(l
p
e)
xk,j (lp
′
e )
yk,j
=
∑
e∈p∩p′
[
(ξe,j)
xk,j
α (lpe)
xk,j
]
·
[
(ξe,j)
yk,j
α (lp
′
e )
yk,j
]
≤
∥∥∥(~ξj )xk,jα (~l p)xk,j∥∥∥ αj
xk,j
·
∥∥∥(~ξj ) yk,jα (~l p′)yk,j∥∥∥ αj
ykj
=
 ∑
e∈p∩p′
ξe,j(l
p
e)
αj

xk,j
αj
·
 ∑
e∈p∩p′
ξe,j(l
p′
e )
αj

yk,j
αj
,
where ~ξj , ~l
p, ~l p
′
represent the vectors composed from ξe, j , l
p
e , and l
p′
e , respectively, for e ∈ p ∩ p′,
the first transition holds since (lpe)xk, j = 0 whenever e ∈ p′−p, and the third transition follows from
Ho¨lder’s inequality. Now consider the terms
∑
e∈p′ ξe, j(l
p
e)xk, j (l
p′
e )yk, j with xk, j = 0 which means
that yk, j = αj since xk, j + yk, j = αj . For these terms, we also have
∑
e∈p′
ξe,j(l
p
e)
xk,j (lp
′
e )
yk,j =
 ∑
e∈p∩p′
ξe,j(l
p
e)
αj

xk,j
αj
·
 ∑
e∈p∩p′
ξe,j(l
p′
e )
αj

yk,j
αj
.
So,
Kj∑
k=1
zk,j
∑
e∈p′
ξe,j(l
p
e)
xk,j (lp
′
e )
yk,j ≤
Kj∑
k=1
zk,j (ϑj(p))
xk,j
αj · (ϑj(p′)) yk,jαj ,
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where ϑj(p) =
∑
e∈p∩p′ ξe,j(l
p
e)αj and ϑj(p
′) =
∑
e∈p∩p′ ξe,j(l
p′
e )αj . We proceed to analyze the upper
bound on
Kj∑
k=1
zk,j (ϑj(p))
xk,j
αj · (ϑj(p′)) yk,jαj
by considering the following two cases.
• ϑj(p) < (2Kjzmax%)αj · ϑj(p′): In this case, we have
Kj∑
k=1
zk,j (ϑj(p))
xk,j
αj
(
ϑj(p
′)
) yk,j
αj ≤
Kj∑
k=1
zk,j(2Kjzmax%)
xk,jϑj(p
′) < Kjzmax(2Kjzmax%)αj · ϑj(p′) ,
where the second transition holds because xk,j < αj and 2Kjzmax% > 1.
• ϑj(p) ≥ (2Kjzmax%)αj · ϑj(p′): In this case, we have
Kj∑
k=1
zk, j(ϑj(p))
xk, j
αj (ϑj(p
′))
yk, j
αj ≤
Kj∑
k=1
zk, jϑj(p) · 1
(2Kjzmax%)yk, j
≤ 1
2%
ϑj(p) ,
where the last transition holds because yk, j ≥ 1 and 2Kjzmax% > 1.
Therefore,
∑
j,k
zk,j(ϑj(p))
xk,j
αj (ϑj(p
′))
yk,j
αj ≤
q∑
j=1
λα%
maxj αjϑj(p
′) + ϑj(p)/(2%)
=λα%
maxj αj
 q∑
j=1
∑
e∈p∩p′
ξe,j(l
p′
e )
αj
+ 1
2%
 q∑
j=1
∑
e∈p∩p′
ξe,j(l
p′
e )
αj

<λα%
maxj αj
∑
e∈p′
σe + q∑
j=1
ξe,j(l
p′
e )
αj

+
1
2%
∑
e∈p
σe + q∑
j=1
ξe,j(l
p
e)
αj

=λα%
maxj αjC(p′) + C(p)/(2%)
which establishes the assertion.  (Claim 6.3)
Together, Claims 6.2 and 6.3 imply that∑
i∈[N ]
Ci(p
′
i, p−i) ≤ (γα + λα%maxj αj )C(p′) + C(p)/(2%) ,
so (3) indeed holds with λ = γα + λα%
maxj αj and µ = 1/(2%).
Since 1/(2%) < 1/(%21) for sufficiently small  > 0, it follows that we can employ Thm. 5.3 with
the smoothness parameters λ = γα+λα ·%maxj αj and µ = 1/(2%) guaranteed by Thm. 6.1 to obtain
the following corollary.
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Corollary. If M is an REP-expanded CSM, then the approximation ratio of Alg-ABRD is
O
(
%maxj αj+1 + % ·maxe minj
(
σe
ξe,j
)1/αj)
.
We now turn to show that some natural and extensively studied CSMs are REP-expanded.
Under the proportional fair CSM (see, e.g., [KR15, GKR14]), the cost share of player i ∈ [N ] in
edge e ∈ pi is defined to be her share of the cost incurred by load lpe on edge e, proportional to her
weight wi(e), namely fi,e(p) =
wi(e)
lpe
Fe(l
p
e).
Lemma 6.4. The proportional fair CSM is REP-expanded.
Proof. Under the proportional fair CSM, the cost share of player i in edge e satisfies
wi(e)
lpe
σe + q∑
j=1
ξe, j(l
p
e)
αj
 ≤ σe + q∑
j=1
ξe, jwi(e) · (lpe)αj−1
= σe +
q∑
j=1
ξe, jwi(e) · [(lpe − wi(e)) + wi(e)]αj−1 ,
where the inequality holds because lpe =
∑
i′:e∈pi′ wi′,e ≥ wi(e). Consider the following two cases.
• 0 ≤ lpe − wi(e) ≤ wi(e): Since α− 1 > 0, it follows that
σe +
∑
j
ξe, jwi(e) · [(lpe − wi(e)) + wi(e)]αj−1 ≤ σe +
∑
j
ξe, jwi(e) · (2 · wi(e))αj−1
= σe +
∑
j
ξe, j2
αj−1(wi(e))αj .
• lpe − wi(e) > wi(e): In this case,
σe +
∑
j
ξe, jwi(e) · [(lpe − wi(e)) + wi(e)]αj−1 < σe +
∑
j
ξe, j2
αj−1wi(e)(lpe − wi(e))αj−1 .
The assertion follows by taking Kj = 2, x1,j = 0, y1,j = αj , z1,j = 2
αj−1, x2,j = αj − 1, y2,j = 1,
and z2,j = 2
αj−1 for every j ∈ [q].
Let Se = {i ∈ [N ] | e ∈ pi} and let pie be a random permutation of Se. Under the Shapley
CSM (see, e.g., [KR15, GKR14]), the cost share of player i ∈ [N ] in edge e ∈ pi is defined to be its
expected marginal contribution if the players are added to e one-by-one in pie order. More formally,
taking Sie(pie) to denote the set of players that precede player i in pie, the cost share of i in edge e
under the Shapley CSM is
fi,e(p) =
E
[
Fe
(∑
i′∈Sie(pie)wi′,e + wi(e)
)
− Fe
(∑
i′∈Sie(pie)wi′,e
)]
, if e ∈ pi
0 , otherwise
.
Lemma 6.5. The Shapley CSM is REP-expanded.
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Proof. Under the Shapley CSM, the cost share of player i ∈ [N ] in edge e ∈ pi is
fi,e(p) ≤ E
σe +∑
j
ξe, j
 ∑
i′∈Sie(pie)
wi′,e + wi(e)
αj −∑
j
ξe, j
 ∑
i′∈Sie(pie)
wi′,e
αj
≤ σe +
∑
j
ξe, j
 ∑
i′∈(Se−{i})
wi′,e + wi(e)
αj −∑
j
ξe, j
 ∑
i′∈(Se−{i})
wi′,e
αj
= σe +
∑
j
ξe, j(l
p
e)
αj −
∑
j
ξe, j(l
p
e − wi(e))αj ,
where the first transition holds since for any l ≥ 0, ∑j ξe, jlαj ≤ Fe(l) ≤ σe +∑j ξe, jlαj and the
second transition holds since the function g(x) = xα is superadditive for any α > 1. Consider the
following two cases.
• lpe ≤ 3 · wi(e): In this case,
σe +
∑
j
ξe, j(l
p
e)
αj −
∑
j
ξe, j(l
p
e − wi(e))αj ≤ σe +
∑
j
ξe, j · 3αj (wi(e))αj .
• lpe > 3 · wi(e): By Newton’s generalized binomial theorem, we have
σe +
∑
j
ξe, j(l
p
e)
αj −
∑
j
ξe, j(l
p
e − wi(e))αj
≤ σe +
∑
j
ξe, j
∞∑
k=0
(
αj
k
)
(lpe − wi(e))αj−k(wi(e))k −
∑
j
ξe, j(l
p
e − wi(e))αj
= σe +
∑
j
ξe, j
∞∑
k=1
(
αj
k
)
(lpe − wi(e))αj−k(wi(e))k
< σe +
∑
j
ξe, j
(
αj⌊
αj+1
2
⌋)wi(e)(lpe − wi(e))αj−1 ∞∑
k=1
(
wi(e)
lpe − wi(e)
)k−1
< σe +
∑
j
ξe, j
(
αj⌊
αj+1
2
⌋)wi(e)(lpe − wi(e))αj−1 ∞∑
k=1
(
1
2
)k−1
< σe + 2
∑
j
ξe, j
(
αj⌊
αj+1
2
⌋)wi(e)(lpe − wi(e))αj−1 ,
where the third transition holds because for any α > 1 and k ∈ Z+, the absolute value of (αk) is
at most
( α
bα+12 c
)
.
The assertion follows by taking Kj = 2, x1, j = 0, y1, j = αj , z1, j = 3
αj , x2, j = αj − 1, y2, j = 1,
and z2, j = 2
( αj⌊
αj+1
2
⌋) for every j ∈ [q].
7 The Potential Function of the Shapley Cost Sharing Mechanism
The next step is to prove that among the REP-expanded CSMs, there exists one that induces a
GND game with an (A,B)-bounded potential function for sufficiently small A,B ≥ 1. (Recall that
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by Thm. 5.3, this would provide an upper bound on the number of steps in the ABRD.) While we
could not accomplish this task for the proportional fair CSM, the Shapley CSM turned out to be
more successful.
It can be inferred from [RS16, HMC89, KR15] that the GND game induced by the Shapley
CSM admits the potential function
Φ(p) =
∑
e∈p
∑
i∈Se
fi,e(S
i
e(ψe) ∪ {i}) , (7)
where Se = {j ∈ [N ] | e ∈ pj}, ψe is an arbitrary permutation of Se, and Sie(ψe) is the set of players
that precede i in ψe. Note that in contrast to the random permutation pie used in the definition
of the Shapley CSM, the permutation ψe is an (arbitrary) deterministic permutation. The rest of
this section is dedicated to proving that this potential function is (HN , dmaxj αje)-bounded, where
HN is the N -th harmonic number. Define the function he : 2[N ] → R≥0 by setting
he(X) =
∑
j∈[q]
ξe, j ·
(∑
i∈X
wi(e)
)αj
.
Lemma 7.1. For any edge e and any permutation ψe, we have
∑
i∈Se
fi,e(S
i
e(ψe) ∪ {i}) =
|Se|∑
k=1
σe
k
+
∑
T⊆Se,|T |=k
he(T )(|Se|
k
) · k
 .
Proof. By the definition of the Shapley CSM, the cost share of player i who uses edge e is
fi,e(Se) = E
Fe
 ∑
i′∈Sie(pie)
wi′,e + wi(e)
− Fe
 ∑
i′∈Sie(pie)
wi′,e
 ,
where pie is a random permutation on Se. For a fixed pie and a fixed player i using edge e,
Fe
 ∑
i′∈Sie(pie)
wi′,e + wi(e)
− Fe
 ∑
i′∈Sie(pie)
wi′,e

=
σe + he({i})− he(∅) , if Sie(pie) = ∅he(Sie(pie) ∪ {i})− he(Sie(pie)) , otherwise
= 1(Sie(pie) = ∅) · σe + he(Sie(pie) ∪ {i})− he(Sie(pie)) ,
where 1(Sie(pie) = ∅) denotes the indicator of the event Sie(pie) = ∅. Since pie is taken from the
uniform distribution, it follows that P(Sie(pie) = ∅) = 1|Se| for any player i using edge e, thus
E
Fe
 ∑
i′∈Sie(pie)
wi′,e + wi(e)
− Fe
 ∑
i′∈Sie(pie)
wi′,e
 = σe|Se|+E [he(Sie(pie) ∪ {i})− he(Sie(pie))] .
(8)
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Let Hi,e(Se) = E[he(Sie(pie) ∪ {i})− he(Sie(pie))]. Then, it can be inferred from Eq. (8) that for
any player i using e,
fi,e(S
i
e(ψe) ∪ {i}) =
σe
|Sie(ψe) ∪ {i}|
+Hi,e
(
Sie(ψe) ∪ {i}
)
.
Since
∑
i∈Se
σe
|Sie(ψe)∪{i}| =
∑|Se|
k=1
σe
k , it follows that
∑
i∈Se
fi,e(S
i
e(ψe) ∪ {i}) =
|Se|∑
k=1
σe
k
+
∑
i∈Se
Hi,e
(
Sie(ψe) ∪ {i}
)
.
Notice that Hi,e(Se) can be viewed as the Shapley cost share of a player i who uses edge e in a
network game where the cost of each edge e is he(Se). Since for every j, αj is assumed to be larger
than 1, the ratio h(Se)le =
∑
j ξe, j(le)
αj
le
is non-decreasing with le. Kollias and Roughgarden [KR15]
prove that in such case, for any ψe,∑
i∈Se
Hi,e
(
Sie(ψe) ∪ {i}
)
=
∑
T⊆Se,|T |=k
he(T )(|Se|
k
) · k ,
thus establishing the assertion.
We are now ready to prove that the potential function Φ(p) of (7) is (dmaxj αje,HN )-bounded.
Theorem 7.2. The potential function Φ(p) of the GND game induced by the Shapley CSM satisfies
1
dmaxj αje · C(p) ≤ Φ(p) ≤ HN · C(p) for any strategy profile p.
Proof. Let us first prove the lower bound on Φ(p). Since e ∈ p implies that |Se| ≥ 1, we get
Φ(p) =
∑
e∈p
|Se|∑
k=1
σe
k
+
∑
T⊆Se,|T |=k
he(T )(|Se|
k
) · k
 ≥ ∑
e∈p
σe + |Se|∑
k=1
∑
T⊆Se,|T |=k
he(T )(|Se|
k
) · k
 .
By the convexity of ξe, j · xαj , we conclude that
Φ(p) ≥
∑
e∈p
σe + q∑
j=1
ξe, j
|Se|∑
k=1
1(|Se|
k
) · k
(|Se|
k
)(∑
T⊆Se,|T |=k
∑
i∈T wi(e)(|Se|
k
) )αj
 .
Since every player i is included in exactly
(|Se|−1
k−1
)
subsets of Se with k elements, it follows that
Φ(p) ≥
∑
e∈p
σe + q∑
j=1
ξe,j
|Se|∑
k=1
1
k
((|Se|−1
k−1
)
lpe(|Se|
k
) )αj
 ≥ ∑
e∈p
σe + q∑
j=1
ξe,j
(
lpe
|Se|
)αj |Se|∑
k=1
kαj−1

≥
∑
e∈p
σe + q∑
j=1
ξe,j
(
lpe
|Se|
)αj ( 1
|Se|
)dαje−αj |Se|∑
k=1
kdαje−1
 .
Employing [ADK+08], we conclude that
Φ(p) ≥
∑
e∈p
σe + q∑
j=1
ξe,j
(
lpe
|Se|
)αj ( 1
|Se|
)dαje−αj |Se|dαje
dαje
 ≥ 1dmaxj αje∑e∈p [σe +
∑
j
ξe,j(l
p
e)
αj ] .
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For the upper bound on Φ(p), by Lem. 7.1 and since he(T ) is a (set-wise) increasing function
of T and T ⊆ Se, we get
Φ(p) =
∑
e∈p
|Se|∑
k=1
σe
k
+
∑
T⊆Se,|T |=k
he(T )(|Se|
k
) · k
 ≤ ∑
e∈p
H|Se| · σe + |Se|∑
k=1
∑
T⊆Se,|T |=k
he(Se)(|Se|
k
) · k
 .
As there are exactly
(|Se|
k
)
subsets of Se with k elements, it follows that
Φ(p) ≤
∑
e∈p
H|Se| · σe + |Se|∑
k=1
he(Se)
k
 = ∑
e∈p
(H|Se| · σe +H|Se| · he(Se))
=
∑
e∈p
H|Se| ·
σe + ∑
j∈[q]
ξe, j
(∑
i∈Se
wi(e)
)αj .
Since e ∈ p means that lpe > 0, we conclude that
Φ(p) ≤
∑
e∈p
H|Se|Fe(lpe) ≤ HN · C(p)
which establishes the assertion.
8 Polynomial-Time -Approximation of Shapley Cost Sharing
So far, we have proved that the Shapley CSM can satisfy the requirements on the smoothness and
the potential function. It remains to show how to compute an -approximation of the cost shares
specified by the Shapley CSM in polynomial time for a sufficiently small  > 0. For the problem of
computing the cost shares specified by the Shapley CSM, Liben-Nowell et al. [LNSWW12] establish
the following lemma.
Lemma 8.1 ([LNSWW12]). There exists an FPRAS (i.e., a randomized FPTAS), referred to as
SV-Sample, for computing the cost shares in any game subject to the Shapley CSM and super-
modular monotone cost functions. In particular, given any ε ∈ (0, 1), SV-Sample generates an
ε-approximation of the cost share with probability at least 1 − 1
2(TN |E|)2 in O
(
log(TN |E|) ·
[
N3
ε2
+
log(log(TN |E|))
])
-time.
Note that owing to the existence of the term σe, the cost function Fe(l) is not supermodular.
The following lemma comes to our help.
Lemma 8.2. The function he(X) (defined in the statement of Lem. 7.1) is supermodular.
Proof. Recall that he(X) =
∑
j∈[q] ξe,j
(∑
i∈X wi(e)
)α
. By definition, he(X) is supermodular if for
any X1 ⊂ X2 ⊂ X and i′ ∈ X\X2:
q∑
j=1
ξe, j
[( ∑
i∈X1∪{i′}
wi(e)
)αj − ( ∑
i∈X1
wi(e)
)αj] ≤ q∑
j=1
ξe, j
[( ∑
i∈X2∪{i′}
wi(e)
)αj − ( ∑
i∈X2
wi(e)
)αj]
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Therefore, it suffices to prove that for any three non-negative numbers x1, x2 and y, (x1 + y)
αj −
(x1)
αj ≤ (x1 + x2 + y)αj − (x1 + x2)αj holds for any αj > 1. Let v(x1, x2, y) = (x1 + x2 + y)αj −
(x1 + x2)
αj . Then we have:
∂v
∂x2
= αj
[
(x1 + x2 + y)
αj−1 − (x1 + x2)αj−1
]
Since αj > 1,
∂v
∂x2
> 0 when x2 > 0. Therefore, v(x1, x2, y) ≥ v(x1, 0, y) = (x1 + y)αj − (x1)αj .
Combining Lemma 8.1 and Lemma 8.2 with Eq. (8), we get an efficient procedure, named
Shapley-APX, for computing the -approximation of the Shapley cost share for any given player i
and edge e with respect to our cost function.
More specifically, if i /∈ Se, then this procedure returns 0 as the cost share. Otherwise,
Shapley-APX uses algorithm SV-Sample to obtain an -approximation θi,e of the Shapley cost
share for player i on edge e with respect to the cost function he(Se). Finally,
σe
|Se| + θi,e is returned
as the desired -cost share. By Eq. (8), Lemma 8.1 and Lemma 8.2, the following lemma trivially
holds.
Lemma 8.3. Procedure Shapley-APX computes an -approximation of the cost share of a player i
on edge e with probability at least 1− 1
2(TN |E|)2 in O
(
log(TN |E|) ·
[
N3
2
+ log(log(TN |E|))
])
-time.
Theorem 8.4. If Shapley-APX is employed to generate all the -cost shares used in Alg-ABRD,
then w.h.p., every -cost share f˜i,e(Se) is an -approximation of the exact cost share fi,e(Se).
Proof. Recall that the ABRD contains at most T steps. In each step t, every player i needs to
calculate f˜i,e(S
t
e∪{i}) for every edge e to find its best approximate response. Therefore, procedure
Shapley-APX is invoked at most TN |E| times. The probability that this function generates a result
that is not the -approximation of the exact cost share is at most TN |E| ·
[
1−
(
1− 1
2(TN |E|)2
)]
=
1
2TN |E| . Therefore, this theorem follows.
Using the facts that , λα (from Thm. 6.1), and %
2
1/2 are all constants, and HN can be bounded
by O(logN), the main result is established as summed up in the following theorem.
Theorem 8.5. By plugging the Shapley CSM into Alg-ABRD, the total cost of the output profile is
an O
(
% ·maxe minj
(
σe
ξe,j
) 1
αj + %maxj αj+1
)
-approximation of the optimal result with probability at
least
1−O
(
1
N2|E| log2N
)
.
The time complexity of the algorithm is
O
(
N5 log2N · |E| log2(N |E|)
)
.
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9 Implementation in a Decentralized Environment
The approximation algorithm Alg-ABRD that was developed up to now is centralized, and in par-
ticular two main aspects of the algorithm are incompatible with some common settings in game
theory. The first aspect is that Alg-ABRD deterministically chooses a specific player for strategy
update. Instead, if traffic requests were separate uncoordinated entities, it would make more sense
that they decide to update their strategies in an uncoordinated way. The second aspect is that
Alg-ABRD chooses the best profile it has seen during the ABRD. However, it is inappropriate in
game theory to ask uncoordinated individual entities to “roll back” to a previous profile that might
be more costly for some of them.
This section tackles these issues by providing two techniques for adapting algorithm Alg-ABRD
to the game-theoretic settings. First, instead of choosing a specific player for updating the strategy,
we now select the player uniformly at random. We believe that this better simulates the behaviors
of uncoordinated players. Subsection 9.1 shows that this modification will still yield the same
approximation ratio, with only a polynomial loss in the number of steps. Second, instead of
choosing the best configuration in the sequence, subsection 9.2 analyzes the case where the last
configuration is chosen. It is shown that the approximation ratio loses another O(logN) factor.
Thus, while certainly inferior to the centralized algorithm, the game-theoretic version of Alg-ABRD
still admits an approximately optimal outcome.
9.1 Randomized Selection and Decentralized Implementation
This subsection develops a random procedure of selecting the players for strategy updates. Specif-
ically, it is assumed that all the players share the same source of random bits, which generates a
number i ∈ [N ] randomly and uniformly for each step t in which the ABRD has not converged. If
the player with the same index satisfies:
δti > 0 (9)
then it unilaterally deviates to its best approximate response p′i to p
t. Otherwise, it does nothing.
Lemma 9.1. For any step t ≥ 1 where the ABRD does not converge, as long as the player selected
for strategy update satisfies Eq. (9), we have Φ(pt−1)− Φ(pt) > 0.
Proof. Since the ABRD does not converge at step t, there exists a player j who is selected to update
its strategy. By the definition of the potential function:
Φ(pt−1)− Φ(pt) = Cj(pt−1)− Cj(ptj , pt−1−j )
≥ 1
1 + 
C˜j(p
t−1)− 1
1− C˜j(p
t
j , p
t−1
−j )
>
1
1 + 
1C˜j(p
t
j , p
t−1
−j )−
1
1− C˜j(p
t
j , p
t−1
−j )
= 0
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The second formula follows from the definition of the -individual cost. The third one follows from
Eq. (9).
Theorem 9.2. With probability at least 12 , the output p
t∗ of the revised algorithm which uses the
random selection can satisfy:
C(pt
∗
) ≤ 2%
2
1λ
1− %21µ
· C∗
if we change the number of steps in ABRD to T ′ = N · T 2.
Proof. According to Lemma 5.1, here we can still only focus on the case where the ABRD does not
converge. In this case, the T ′ steps need to be partitioned into T stages, each of which contains
N · T steps. We say a player i is appropriate for step t if δtj satisfies Eq. (4). A step t is said to be
appropriate if in this step an appropriate player is selected, and a stage is appropriate if it contains
at least one appropriate step. Then we have:
Claim 9.3. With probability at least 12 , all the T stages are appropriate.
Proof. If the ABRD does not converge, then the Pigeonhole Principle shows that there exists at
least one appropriate player in each step. By the assumption on the random source, each step is
appropriate with probability 1N . Therefore, the probability that there exists no appropriate step in
a stage must be: (
1− 1
N
)NT ≤ ( 1
exp(1)
)T
Hence, the probability that all the stages are appropriate is:(
1−
(
1− 1
N
)NT)T ≥ (1− ( 1
exp(1)
)T)T
>
(
1−
(1
2
)T)T
>
1
2
The last inequality above holds because
(
1
2
)T
+
(
1
2
)1/T
decreases with T when T >
1.  (Claim 9.3)
Recall that we say a profile pt is bad if C(pt) >
2%21λ
1−%21µ
· C∗. Then we have:
Claim 9.4. For any appropriate stage k, if all the profiles generated in this stage are bad, then
Φ(pt
1
k ) <
(
1− 1
Q
)
Φ(pt
0
k−1), where t0k an t
1
k respectively represent the first and the last steps in stage
k.
Proof. Since the player selected in each step does not update its strategy unless Eq. (9) is satisfied,
Lemma 9.1 indicates that the potential function is non-increasing in all the steps. Let t∗k be an
arbitrary appropriate step in stage k. Then we have:
Φ(pt
1
k ) ≤ Φ(pt∗k ) <
(
1− 1
Q
)
Φ(pt
∗
k−1) ≤
(
1− 1
Q
)
Φ(pt
0
k−1) ,
where the second inequality follows from Claim 5.4.  (Claim 9.4)
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Combining Claim 9.4 with the techniques in the proof of Theorem 5.3, we can prove that if all
the stages are appropriate, then at least one stage generates a profile that is not bad.
Putting Theorem 9.2, Theorem 6.1, Theorem 7.2 and Theorem 8.4 together, we can get:
Corollary 9.5. The revised algorithm where the player for strategy update is determined uniformly
at random yields the same approximation ratio as Alg-ABRD with probability at least
1
2
(
1−O
(
1
N2|E| log2N
))
.
The time complexity of the revised algorithm is
O
(
N7 log4N · |E| log2(N |E|)
)
.
9.2 Output the Last Strategy Profile
In this subsection, we study the approach of directly returning the last strategy instead of the one
with the minimum overall cost, pt
∗
.
Theorem 9.6. Suppose that the ABRD does not converge at any step t, then the cost corresponding
to the last profile is at most dmaxj αjeHN times larger than C(pt∗), no matter whether the player
in each step is selected in the deterministic way or in a random one.
Proof. Let tmax be the last step of the ABRD. This theorem trivially holds when t
∗ = tmax. Suppose
that t∗ < tmax, then:
C(ptmax) ≤ dmax
j
αjeΦ(ptmax) < dmax
j
αjeΦ(pt∗) ≤ dmax
j
αjeHNC(pt∗)
The first inequality and the last one hold since the potential function is (HN , dαe)-bounded. The
second inequality follows from Eq. (4), Eq. (9) and Lemma 9.1, for both the deterministic selection
and the random selection.
Since HN is bounded by O(logN), it can be inferred that:
Corollary 9.7. Returning the strategy profile generated in the last step of the ABRD instead of
pt
∗
as the output will increase the approximation ratio by O(logN) times.
10 PoA of the GND Game: Upper Bound and Lower Bound
A byproduct obtained in this paper is a tight bound on the PoA of the GND games for a class of
CSMs. In [Rou15], it is proved that the PoA of a smooth cost minimization game is
inf
{
λ
1− µ : the game is (λ, µ)-smooth
}
.
Such a PoA is said to be robust and can be extended to the mixed Nash equilibrium, correlated
equilibrium, and coarse correlated equilibrium [Rou15]. From Theorem 6.1, it can be inferred that:
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Figure 1: A network for proving the lower bound on the PoA.
Theorem 10.1. For any REP-expanded CSM M , the induced GND game has a robust PoA of
O
(
max
e∈E
min
j∈[q]
( σe
ξe, j
) 1
αj
)
.
In the following, we prove that the upper bound in Theorem 10.1 asymptotically matches the
lower bound on the PoA of the games induced by a wide class of CSMs, the budget-balanced ones.
Definition 10.2 (Budget-balanced cost sharing[CRV10, vFH13]). A CSM M is budget-balanced
if for any player i and any edge e: ∑
i∈Se
fi,e(p) = Fe(l
p
e) . (10)
Theorem 10.3. For any budget-balanced CSM, there exists induced GND games with a PoA of
Ω
(
maxe minj
(
σe
ξe, j
) 1
αj
)
.
Proof. Consider the GND game induced by the GND problem with routing requests and the budget-
balanced CSM. Suppose that the number of players N =
(
σ
ξ
) 1
α
, where σ > 0 and ξ > 0 are properly
chosen such that σξ is large enough, and α > 1. Construct a graph as shown in Fig. 1. For every
i ∈ [N ], there are an edge ei from s to ti, and an edge e′i from t∗ to ti. The nodes s and t∗ are
connected by e∗. The parameters in the energy cost functions are set as follows:
• σe∗ = NN+1 · σ, and ξe∗,1 = NN+1 · ξ.
• For every i ∈ [N ], σei = σ, and ξei,1 = ξ.
• For every i ∈ [N ], σe′i = 1N+1 · σ, and ξe′i,1 = 3N+1 · ξ.
• α1 = α.
• For every 2 ≤ j ≤ q, 1 < αj < α1, ξe, j < ξe, 1/[qNαj (N + 1)].
With these settings, we have maxe minj
(
σe
ξe, j
) 1
αj =
(
σ
ξ
) 1
α
.
For each player i, its source and target are set to (s, ti), and its weight wi(e) is set to 1 for every
edge e. Then each player i has two alternative paths, {ei} and {e∗, e′i}. Consider the profile where
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every player i chooses the path {ei}. With any budget-balanced CSM, the cost of each player i
must be:
fi,ei(p) = Fi,ei(1) = σei +
q∑
j=1
ξei, j < σ + ξ ·
N + 2
N + 1
The first transition follows from Definition 10.2, since Sei only contains player i for every i ∈ [N ].
The last transition holds since Nαj > 1 for every j. If any player i changes its choice to {e∗, e′i},
with any budget-balanced CSM, its cost would be:
fi,e∗(p) + fi,e′i(p) = Fi,e
∗(1) + Fi,e′i(1)
> σe∗ + ξe∗, 1 + σe′i + ξe′i, 1
=
N
N + 1
σ +
N
N + 1
ξ +
1
N + 1
σ +
3
N + 1
ξ
= σ +
N + 3
N + 1
ξ
where the first equality still follows Definition 10.2. Therefore, any player i cannot decrease its cost
through a unilateral deviation. By definition, this profile is a pure Nash equilibrium.
The total cost incurred by this equilibrium is N · (σei +
∑
j ξei, j) > N(σ + ξ). In contrast, if
every player chooses the path {e∗, e′i}, the total cost would be:
σe∗ +
∑
j
ξe∗, j ·Nαj +N · (σe′i +
∑
j
ξe′i, j) <
N
N + 1
c+
N
N + 1
ξ ·Nα (11)
+N(
1
N + 1
σ +
3
N + 1
ξ) +
2
N + 1
ξ
=
N
N + 1
σ +
N
N + 1
σ +
N
N + 1
σ +
3N + 2
N + 1
ξ
< 3(σ + ξ)
Thus, the price of anarchy would be at least N(σ+ξ)3(σ+ξ) =
N
3 . Since N = (
σ
ξ )
1
α , this theorem follows.
From Lemma 6.4, Lemma 6.5, and Theorem 10.1, it follows that for both the proportional fair
CSM and the Shapley CSM, the induced GND games have a PoA of O
(
maxe minj(σe/ξe, j)
1/αj
)
.
Then from Theorem 10.3, we know that these two natural CSMs are asymptotically optimal in the
class of budget balanced CSMs, since they trivially follow Eq. (10).
11 Alternative Approaches
11.1 Learning Based Algorithm for the GND problem with Routing Requests
Up to now, a set of game theoretic results, such as the smoothness parameters, have been established
to investigate the performance of Alg-ABRD. Nevertheless, Alg-ABRD is not the only framework
that can utilize the smoothness to generate outputs with desired approximation ratio. In this
part, we start to introduce a learning-based technique [Rou15], which can also guarantee a good
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approximation for the GND problem with routing requests when the optimal cost C∗ of the input
instance has a constant lower bound.
Definition (GND problem with Routing Requests). In the GND problem with routing requests,
the resources are represented by the set E of edges in a given graph G = (V,E), where V is the
set of nodes. The feasible reply collection Pi of each requirement i is composed of the paths which
connect the associated source-target node pair, and contain no repeating edges.
Definition (Problem of Online Decision[KV05]). Consider an online problem where the input
consists of a network G = (V,E) and a sequence of T ′ cost vectors
{
τ t = {τ t(e)}e∈E
}
t∈[T ′]
, where
τ t(e) ∈ [0, 1]. For each t ∈ [T ′], this online problem requires a path rt between a given source-
target node pair without any knowledge of the cost vectors {τ t, τ t+1, · · · , τT ′}. The objective is to
minimize the REGRET, which is defined as follows:
REGRET =
T ′∑
t=1
∑
e∈rt
τ t(e)− min
r′:r′ connects {s,t}
T ′∑
t=1
∑
e∈p′
τ t(e)
Lemma 11.1 (Follow the Perturbed Leader (FPL) [KV05]). For the problem of online decision,
there exists a randomized online learning algorithm called FPL [KV05] that can compute every rt
in O(|E|+ |V | log |V |)-time such that the expected value of REGRET is no larger than 2|V |√|E|T ′.
Using FPL as a subroutine, a learning based algorithm, referred to as L-APX, is constructed
as follows for the GND problem with routing requests. The first step is to transform the given
problem instance I to an GND game by employing the proportional fair CSM, and divide every
σe and every ξe,j by a large enough number such that the cost share of any player on any edge is
in the interval [0, 1]. Obviously, such a linear scaling on the cost functions {Fe} does not influence
the approximation ratio. Then, generate T ′ = 4N2|V |2|E| strategy profiles {p¯t}t∈[T ′]. For every
t and every player i, the path p¯ti is obtained by running FPL with τ
t′
i =
{
{τ t′i (e) = fi,e(St
′
e ∪
{i})}e∈E
}
t′∈[t−1]
as the input. Note that with the proportional fair CSM, the exact cost share of
each player on each edge can be obtained in constant time. Finally, choose one strategy profile t∗
from [T ′] randomly and uniformly, and output p¯t∗ .
Lemma 11.2. The algorithm L-APX has a time complexity of O(N3|V |2|E|2 log |V |).
Theorem 11.3. Let C ′∗ be the optimal result with respect to the linearly scaled cost functions. If
C ′∗ is known to have a constant lower bound LB, then algorithm L-APX guarantees an approximation
ratio of O
(
maxe∈E minj∈[q]
(
σe
ξe,j
) 1
αj
)
for the GND problem with routing requests.
Proof. According to [Rou13], for a (λ, µ)-smooth game, by generating the strategy profiles {p¯t}t∈[T ′]
through a randomized algorithm for the problem of online decision, the chosen strategy profile p¯t
∗
guarantees that:
Ep¯t∗ [C
′(p¯t
∗
)] ≤ λ
1− µC
′∗ +
1
1− µ
∑N
i=1 E{p¯ti}t∈[T ′] [REGRET]
T ′
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where C ′(p¯t∗) represents the total cost with respect to the scaled cost functions. By Theorem 6.1,
the values of γα and λα are not influenced by the linear scaling on ce and ξe,j . Thus,
Ep¯t∗ [C
′(p¯t
∗
)] ≤ 2(γα + λα)C ′∗ +
2 ·∑Ni=1 E{p¯ti}t∈[T ′] [REGRET]
T ′
≤ 2(γα + λα)C ′∗ + N · 4|V |
√|E|T ′
T ′
≤ 2
(
γα + λα +
1
LB
)
C ′∗
The second line above follows from Lemma 11.1. The third line holds because it is assumed that
OPT′ ≥ LB. Since LB is a constant, this theorem holds.
Lemma 11.2 and Theorem 11.3 indicate that, L-APX promises the same upper bound on the
approximation ratio as Alg-ABRD for the special input instances with C
′∗ ≥ LB, and when the
given graph has a small size while the number of requirements is large, L-APX has a better time
complexity than Alg-ABRD. However, it remains unknown for us that how to generalize Theorem
11.3 to the general case where there is no guarantee for the lower bound of the optimal solution.
The critical issue here is that even before the linear scaling, the optimal result C∗ can be arbitrarily
small. This problem is left for future research.
11.2 Convex Programming and Rounding for the GND Problem with Routing
Requests
The approach presented in this subsection was suggested to us by an anonymous reviewer for
a special case of the GND problem. Specifically, like the approach presented in Sec. 11.1, this
approach also addresses the GND problem with routing requests, but restricts the attention to
the more specific case where the given graph is undirected and the weights of the requirements
are related. (Recall that related weights means that the weight of every requirement i satisfies
wi(e) = wi for every e ∈ E.) Furthermore, in this part, the cost function Fe of each edge e is
assumed to be an energy consumption cost function (1), a specific (simpler) form of the REP cost
functions (2) used in the other parts of this paper. We shall refer to this specific GND restriction
as energy efficient routing (EER).
Since this approach is based on convex programming and rounding, we shall refer to the resulting
approximation algorithm as CPR. In this algorithm, every requirement i ∈ [N ] is first partitioned
into a set R′i of wi sub-requests, where every sub-request ij is associated with the same source-target
node pair as the original requirement i, and has the same weight wij = 1. Such a partition is feasible
since the weights are assumed to be related. Let R′ = ⋃iR′i be the set of all the sub-requests, I ′
be the instance obtained by replacing the set of requirements in the given EER instance I with R′,
and Î ′ be a variant instance which replaces the energy consumption cost function Fe in I ′ with the
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following variant cost function:
F̂e(p
′) =
0 l
p′
e = 0
σe + ξe ·
(
(lp
′
e )α +
∑
i(wi)
α−1 · lp′e (i)
)
lp
′
e > 0
, (12)
where p′ is an arbitrary feasible path profile forR′, lp′e (i) is the load incurred by routing sub-requests
in R′i along e. Let p̂∗ be the fractional optimal solution of Î ′. Similar with [AE05], it can be proved
that:
Lemma 11.4. Ĉ(p̂∗) < 2 · C∗, where Ĉ(·) denotes the total cost with respect to Eq. (12).
Proof. The path profile p∗ also induces a feasible solution for Î ′, which routes ij along the path p∗i
for every i ∈ [N ]. Let the total cost incurred by this feasible solution be Ĉ(p∗), then:
Ĉ(p̂∗) ≤ Ĉ(p∗) =
∑
e∈p∗
[
σe + ξe ·
(
(lp
∗
e )
α +
∑
i
(wi)
α−1 · lp∗ie
)]
=
∑
e∈p∗
[
σe + ξe ·
(
(lp
∗
e )
α +
∑
i∈p∗
(wi)
α
)]
≤
∑
e∈p∗
[
σe + ξe ·
(
(lp
∗
e )
α + (lp
∗
e )
α
)]
< 2 ·
∑
e∈p∗
(
σe + ξe · (lp∗e )α
)
= 2 · C∗
The second line holds since p∗ is an integral solution of I [AE05]. The third line following the
fact
∑
i∈p∗ wi = l
p∗
e and the superadditivity of the power function. The fourth line holds since
σe > 0.
The next step of CPR is to utilize the convex programming based technique proposed in [AAZZ12]
to generate a solution for the instance Î ′. In particular, it converts F̂e(p′) to a convex cost function
F¯e(p
′) = We(p′) + ξe
∑
i(wi)
α−1 · lp′e (i), where:
We(p
′) =

ζe · (lp
′
e ) l
p′
e ∈
[
0,max
{
1,
(
σe
(α−1)µe
) 1
α
}]
σe + ξe · (lp
′
e )α l
p′
e > max
{
1,
(
σe
(α−1)µe
) 1
α
} ,
and
ζe =
σe + µe
(
σe
(α−1)µe
) 1
α
< 1
αξe
(
σe
(α−1)ξe
)1− 1
α
(
σe
(α−1)µe
) 1
α
< 1 ≥ 1
.
Following [AAZZ12], CPR solves the convex programming problem with respect to the convex cost
function F¯e(p
′) to obtain a fractional solution p̂◦, then rounds it to an integral solution p̂] in a
randomized manner. Using the linearity of expectation, for every edge e ∈ E:
E
[
ξe
∑
i
(wi)
α−1 · lp̂]e (i)
]
= ξe
∑
i
(wi)
α−1 · E
[
lp̂
]
e (i)
]
= ξe
∑
i
(wi)
α−1 · lp̂◦e (i) (13)
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Furthermore, it is proved in [AAZZ12] that the random rounding technique ensures that:
E
[
We(p̂
])
]
≤ O
((σe
ξe
) 1
α
)
·We(p̂◦) (14)
Combining Eq. (13) with Eq. (14), we have∑
e
E
[
F¯e(p̂
])
]
≤ O
((
max
e
σe
ξe
) 1
α
)
·
∑
e
F¯e(p̂
◦) (15)
Since p̂◦ is the optimal fractional solution obtained by the convex programming with respect to
the cost function F¯e(p
′), and F¯e(p′) ≤ F̂e(p′) for any edge e and any profile p′ that is feasible for
R′ [AAZZ12]: ∑
e
F¯e(p̂
◦) ≤
∑
e
F¯e(p̂
∗) ≤
∑
e
F̂e(p̂
∗) = Ĉ(p̂∗) (16)
Recall that Ĉ(p̂∗) is the optimal fractional solution of Î ′, Eq. (15) and Eq. (16) imply that:
Lemma 11.5. The solution p̂] is an O
((
maxe
σe
ξe
) 1
α
)
-approximation solution of the instance Î.
The last step of CPR is to convert p̂] to a integral solution p] that is feasible for the original
instance I, still by random rounding. Particularly, to generate p], each traffic request i in instance
I should be routed along the path p̂]ij ∈ p̂] with probability
1
wi
. Then we have
E
[∑
e
Fe(p
])
]
≤ E
∑
e∈p̂]
(
σe + ξe(l
p]
e )
α
)
= E
∑
e∈p̂]
σe
+ E
∑
e∈p̂]
ξe(l
p]
e )
α

≤ E
∑
e∈p̂]
σe
+O(αα)E
∑
e∈p̂]
ξe(l
p̂]
e )
α +
∑
i
(wi)
α−1lp̂
]
e (i)

≤ O(αα)E
∑
e∈p̂]
F̂e(p̂
])
 (17)
The third transition above follows from [GKP11]. Combining Lemma 11.4, Lemma 11.5, and
Eq. (17) gives the following result:
Theorem 11.6. The algorithm CPR has an approximation ratio of O
((
maxe
σe
ξe
) 1
α
)
.
Weight-scaling and Loss in Approximation Ratio The algorithm CPR should process every
sub-request independently, therefore, its time complexity depends on the numeric value
∑
iwi,
which cannot be bounded by a polynomial of the instance size, poly(I). For this issue, a native idea
is to scale down and round the weights so that wi is bounded by a polynomial of |I|. Although this
weight-scaling technique works well for some classical optimization problem, such as the Knapsack
problem, it is possible to incur a significant loss in the approximation ratio for our problem.
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Definition 11.7 (Weight-scaling Function). Given an EER instance I, a weight-scaling function
WSF maps the weight vector {wi}i∈[N ] of I to {WSFI(wi)}i∈[N ] ∈ (Z>0)N such that maxi∈[N ] WSFI(wi)
is bounded by poly(|I|).
Definition 11.8 (Ambiguity). A weight-scaling function is said to be σ-ambiguous for a positive
number σ > 1 if there exists an instance I such that WSFI(wi) = WSFI(wi′) for every wi = 1 and
wi′ = σ
1
α .
To illustrate the ambiguity, consider the weight scaling function in [Pan15], which maps each
weight wi to
⌈
wi ·N
εmaxiwi
⌉
· εmaxiwi
N
where ε is a positive constant less than 1. Such a weight-
scaling function is σ-ambiguous for any σ > 1 when there exists a request iL with a large enough
weight wiL ≥
Nσ
1
α
ε
. Such kind of high-weight request is ignored in the following part, as it can be
placed on an independent subgraph where the edges have sufficiently small parameters σe and ξe
such that the existence of iL does not influence the analysis.
To analyze the loss in approximation ratio caused by a σ-ambiguous weight-scaling function,
consider a graph Gσ constructed as follows. There are two nodes in G, s and t, which are connected
by more than σ
1
2α−1 edges. There exists a special edge e∗ with cost parameters σe∗ = 1 and ξe∗ = 1,
while for any edge e ∈ E−{e∗}, σe = σ and ξe = 1. Following theorem shows that on this graph, a
σ-ambiguous weight-scaling function leads to an approximation ratio that is definitely larger than
the ratio O
(
maxe
(
σe
ξe
) 1
α
)
= O
(
σ
1
α
)
when α > 3+
√
5
2 .
Theorem 11.9. After employing a σ-ambiguous weight-scaling function, the approximation ratio
of any deterministic algorithm for the EER instances on the graph Gσ is Ω
(
σ
α−1
2α−1
)
.
Proof. Consider two input instances, I1 and I2, on the graph Gσ. Each of these two instances
contains N = σ
1
2α−1 requests with the source-target pair {s, t}. For every i ∈ [N ], the weight of
player i is respectively set to 1 and σ
1
α in I1 and I2. Let IMST1 and IMST2 be the corresponding
instances processed by a σ-ambiguous weight-scaling function. By the definition, no algorithm can
distinguish IMST1 from IMST2 . Hence, the following observation trivially holds:
Claim 11.10. For any deterministic algorithm for the EER instance, the output generated for IMST1
is same as the one for IMST2 .
Let the output generated by a given deterministic algorithm of the EER problem for IMST1 be p.
Denote the optimal solution of I1 (resp. I2) by C∗(I1) (resp. C∗(I2)), and the total cost incurred
by p for I1 (resp. I2) be C(I1, p) (resp. C(I2, p)).
Claim 11.11. The approximation ratio of the given deterministic algorithm is at least
max
{
C(I1,p)
C∗(I1) ,
C(I2,p)
C∗(I2)
}
.
Claim 11.12. For any profile p, max
{
C(I1,p)
C∗(I1) ,
C(I2,p)
C∗(I2)
}
≥ 12σ
α−1
2α−1 .
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Proof. Suppose that x edges in E − {e∗} is used by p. Then C(I1, p) ≥ x · (σ + 1). Since the cost
of routing all requests through e∗ in the instance I is 1 + σ α2α−1 ,
C(I1, p)
C∗(I1) ≥
x(σ + 1)
1 + σ
1
α−1
≥ x
2
· σ α−12α−1 .
Noticing that the x+ 1 edges used by p have the same value of the parameter ξe, we have:
C(I2, p) ≥ (x+ 1)
[( N
x+ 1
· σ 1α
)α]
= σ1+
α
2α−1 · (x+ 1)1−α .
By routing each request along a distinct edge, a solution with total cost 2σ1+
1
2α−1 can be obtained
for the instance I ′. Therefore,
C(I2, p)
C∗(I2) ≥
(x+ 1)1−α
2
· σ α−12α−1 .
Note that x ∈ Z≥0. When x ≥ 1, max
{C(I1, p)
C∗(I1) ,
C(I2, p)
C∗(I2)
}
≥ C(I1, p)
C∗(I1) ≥
1
2
σ
α−1
2α−1 ; while if
x = 0, max
{C(I1, p)
C∗(I1) ,
C(I2, p)
C∗(I2)
}
≥ C(I2, p)
C∗(I2) ≥
1
2
σ
α−1
2α−1 .  (Claim 11.12)
This proof is completed by combining the claims above.
For any random algorithm for the EER instance, it should generate an output for the instance
I1 with the same probability distribution over the path profiles as the one for the instance I2.
Therefore, it can be verified that:
Corollary 11.13. After employing a σ-ambiguous weight-scaling function, the approximation ratio
of any random algorithm for the EER problem instances on the graph Gσ is Ω
(
σ
α−1
2α−1
)
.
As mentioned earlier, the approximation ratio Ω
(
σ
α−1
2α−1
)
is worse than the approximation ratio
in our main result when α > 3+
√
5
2 ≈ 2.618. Furthermore, by Theorem 11.6, we cannot expect an
approximation ratio better than our main result when α ≤ 2.618, either, if we combine CPR with a
weight-scaling function.
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